An empirical analysis of systemic and macroeconomic risk in South Africa: an application of the quantile regression by Eita, Joel Hinaunye et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An empirical analysis of systemic and
macroeconomic risk in South Africa: an
application of the quantile regression
Eita, Joel Hinaunye and Ngobese, Sibusiso Blessing and
Muteba Mwamba, John Weirstrass
University of Johannesburg, South Africa, University of
Johannesburg, South Africa, University of Johannesburg, South
Africa
28 March 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101493/
MPRA Paper No. 101493, posted 05 Jul 2020 16:25 UTC
1 
 
An empirical analysis of systemic and macroeconomic risk in South Africa: an 
application of the quantile regression 
 
Joel Hinaunye Eita1  - Sibusiso Blessing Ngobese2  - John W. Muteba Mwamba3 
 
1Corresponding author,   School of Economics, University of Johannesburg, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, 
Johannesburg, 2006, South Africa. Email: jeita@uj.ac.za 
2School of Economics, University of Johannesburg, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2006, South 
Africa. Email: b.sngobese@gmail.com 
3School of Economics, University of Johannesburg, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2006, South 
Africa. Email: johnmu@uj.ac.za  
   
ABSTRACT 
 
This study conducts an empirical analysis on how the build-up of systemic risk in the financial 
system affects downside macroeconomic risk of the South African economy. The study 
outlines and apply several systemic risk measures, namely the conditional value at risk, 
principal component analysis, average conditional volatility and interest rate spreads. 
Thereafter, the study employs the quantile regression to evaluate the predictive ability of each 
systemic risk measures to lower quantiles of economic activity. The study reveals that each of 
the systemic risk measures are significant predictors of macroeconomic risk. The results of this 
study serve as important tools that can help South African financial regulators and 
policymakers to foresee and prevent systemic risk. It enables regulators to identify the build-
up of systemic vulnerabilities, systemically important financial and too connected to fail 
institutions. These are useful in the sense that they serve as early warning signals of financial 
systemic risk and the consequences of such on macroeconomic outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the resultant costs inflicted on economies 
worldwide have testified to the importance of understanding systemic risk1 in the financial 
system and its potential adverse effects on the real economy. The notion of financial fragilities 
triggering large economic downturns which date back to the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Fisher, 1933). However, recent evidence points to the bankruptcy of an investment bank in 
the United States, Lehman Brothers, in the autumn of 2008 that subsequently led to a systemic 
financial crisis. This plunged the global economy into a severe recession (Van Roye, 2014). 
Furthermore, a series of bailouts for troubled banks in the European Union (EU) contributed to 
the Eurozone Debt Crisis which led to devastating consequences on the EU economy (Kräussl, 
Lehnert and Stefanova, 2016).  
Prior to the GFC, the established financial regulatory framework (Basel I, 1988 and Basel 
II, 2004) were configured on the premise that the soundness and safety of individual institutions 
collectively led to financial stability, as seen in microprudential policy. However, both 
regulators and researchers argue that by focusing on each individual institution in seclusion, 
systemic risk can occur unnoticed (Kahou and Lehar, 2017).  During the post-crisis era there 
has been a renewed focus in reforming regulatory frameworks. This was a shift away from a 
narrow approach in regulatory policymaking to a more encompassing method with emphasis 
on mitigating system-wide failure and the macroeconomic costs imposed by financial 
instability (Borio, 2003). In light of that context, the G-20 leaders recommended in April 2009 
that, “regulatory frameworks be reinforced with a macro-prudential overlay that promotes a 
system-wide approach to financial regulation and oversight and mitigates the build-up of 
systemic risk”. They also called for “all financial authorities to take account of financial 
stability and develop effective tools to address systemic risk”. Inspired by these calls, several 
empirical centred around systemic risk (see surveys by Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin and Perignon, 
2017; De bandt and Hartmann, 2000 and Silva, Kimura and Sobreiro, 2017), and the modelling 
thereof (see studies such as Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis, 2012;  and Blancher et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, despite these attempts dedicated to modelling systemic risk, several studies 
have extended critique of these systemic risk research. The studies argue that most of these 
systemic risk measures operate on a “micro-like” scale focusing exclusively on vulnerabilities 
in the financial system or parts thereof, with no assessment of their impact on macroeconomic 
activity2. In addressing these issues, several studies (Allen, Bali and Tang, 2012; and Giglio, 
Kelly and Pruitt, 2016) construct systemic risk measures and provide a macroeconomic 
criterion suggesting the association of the systemic risk measures to future economic 
downturns. Allen et al. (2012) proposes an aggregate systemic risk measure that quantifies the 
risk of catastrophic losses in the financial system denoted (CATFIN) and furthermore, shows 
that the measure can robustly forecast macroeconomic downturns for about six months. Giglio 
                                                          
1 “Systemic risk generally refers to the risk of a disruption to the flow of financial services that is (i) caused by 
an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences on the real economy” (IMF-BIS-FSB, 2009).  
 
2
 See, Allen et al (2012), Benoit et al. (2013), Boucher and Maillet (2015), Giglio et al. (2016), Kleinow et al. 
(2017), De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2017) and Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013). 
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et al. (2016) evaluates whether a set of proposed systemic risk measures demonstrate the ability 
to forecast lower quantiles of macroeconomic shocks. The analysis reveals a few measures 
(predominantly, volatility measures) as possessing the ability to capture macroeconomic 
downside tail risk. Furthermore, the analysis shows that an appropriate aggregation of the 
systemic risk measures encompasses the ability to robustly and significantly predict 
macroeconomic downside risk. Although there seems to be limited studies on systemic risk in 
developing countries, there are some empirical research conducted on South Africa. Bartram 
et al (2007) was one of the first few studies that estimated systemic risk in the international 
financial system and included South Africa. Two South African banks (NBS Boland Bank and 
Nedbank) were included in the estimation. Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) was also one of the 
first studies on systemic risk that included  South Africa, but it measured the contribution of 
one South African bank (Standard Bank)’s contribution to systemic risk in a sample of 
international banks. The limitation of this study is that the focus was only on one bank. This 
make it difficult to draw meaning conclusions from these two studies.  
There are also studies that specifically focus on South Africa. Esterhuysen, Van Vuuren 
and Styger (2011) utilized probabilities of default (PD) and asset return correlations to 
determine whether the financial crisis of 2007-2009 increased systemic risk. Foggitt, Heymans, 
van Vuuren and Pretorius (2017) uses the SRISK (systemic risk) index to measure the level of 
systemic risk in South African financial sector and then investigates which bank is the main 
contributor (to the systemic risk). Manguzvane and Muteba Mwamba (2017) applied the 
conditional value-at-risk and measured the marginal contribution of each bank to systemic risk. 
However, these studies did not evaluate the efficacy of the proposed measures of systemic risk 
as macroprudential tools. This is through the association of each systemic indicator to lower 
quantiles of macroeconomic activity.  
The purpose of this current study is twofold. Firstly, it models the different aspects of 
systemic risk by constructing several measures of systemic risk for monitoring the systemic 
stress in the South African financial system. These measures include the conditional value-at-
risk (CoVaR and ΔCoVaR), as suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016); the principal 
component analysis (PCA) measure of interconnectedness which was proposed by Billio, 
Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012); the average conditional volatility as a measure of 
systemic risk for commercial banks, as proposed by Sankaran (2011); and the interest rate 
spread. Secondly, this current study employs the quantile approach to evaluate the efficacy of 
the proposed measures of systemic risk as macroprudential tools through the association of 
each systemic risk indicator to the lower quantiles of macroeconomic activity (that is 
macroeconomic risk). The current study therefore contributes to recent empirical literature on 
modelling systemic risk in the South African financial system. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to outline and apply a large set of systemic risk measures and the 
macroeconomic criterion to South Africa. 
 
It is important to note that the financial sector is at the centre of the South African economy. 
Every citizen’s life is touched by the financial sector. Through the financial sector, people are 
able conduct economic transactions, save and borrow in order to achieve their aspirations in 
the future. It enables people to insure themselves and against disaster and meet their retirement 
needs. The financial sector is an important enabler of economic growth, employment and 
development of infrastructure which are important for South Africa’s sustainable development. 
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Despite the fact that the South African financial sector is well regulated, it is important to note 
that when there is a global financial crisis immense costs can be incurred.  The recent global 
economic and financial crisis of 2007/2008 indicated that several economies incurred 
significant costs or losses. The financial sector of South Africa proved to be resilient during 
the global economic and financial crisis of 2007/2008, but the country was affected negatively. 
There was an indirect negative impact through job losses in the South African economy. Hence, 
it is important to continue regulating the financial sector properly and there should be no room 
for complacency. These are concerns of South African regulatory institutions who have 
published numerous policy papers reiterating the importance systemic risk. In the year 2011, 
the National Treasury published a policy paper titled “a safer financial sector to serve South 
Africa better”. This publication was followed by a document in 2013 on “implementing a twin 
peaks model of financial regulation in South Africa”. In 2016, SARB published a discussion 
paper on the new macroprudential framework for South Africa, in which it emphasised the 
importance of the management of systemic risk in its deliberation of macroprudential policy 
framework.  
 
The results of the study indicate that the constructed measures demonstrate the ability 
to capture periods of extreme financial distress in the South African financial sector. In the 
process, we identify four largest bank in South Africa, which we call the “Big Four” banks as 
the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and form part of the too interconnected 
to fail (TICTF) institutions in the banking sector, which, if unregulated, may pose grave 
systemic risk. It should be noted that the focus of this study is not to identify which banks are 
systematically important. It falls outside the scope of this study. TICTF is used in developed 
countries such as the USA to refer to a situation where the failure of an entity can result in 
systemic failure. It helps to understand which measures of resilience a country should be taking. 
Many advanced economies such as the USA use TICTF to decide which entity should be 
financially assisted. Furthermore, we show that each of the constructed systemic risk measures 
are significantly informative about lower tails of the distribution of South African economic 
activity as opposed to the median distribution of real economic activity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
comprehensive literature review.  Section 3 describes the methodology while section 4 presents 
the data and discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This study reviews three strands of literature. The first strand of the literature looks at the 
quantitative measures of systemic risk in the financial system. Since the onset of the 2007/8 
GFC, there has been a vast amount of literature focusing on the modeling of systemic risk in 
the financial system. Traditional measures of systemic risk such as those proposed by the IMF-
BIS-FSB (2009) for size, connectedness and substitutability indicators are primarily based on 
balance sheets and supervisory data. However, the literature identifies certain drawbacks with 
the use of balance sheet-derived indicators. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) argues that 
low-frequency indicators fail to inform policymakers about immediate financial distress. 
Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) finds that financial markets data is more applicable in the 
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supervision of the financial system, rather than the infrequent publication of balance sheet 
information which come often with a substantial lag. 
Several sophisticated stock market-derived (high frequency) systemic risk measures have 
been advanced in the literature. Many of these sophisticated measures have focused on 
measuring systemic risk on the institutional level and the contribution of individual institutions 
to system-wide risk, with the intention of identifying systemically relevant institutions. Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2008; 2016) developed the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR as measures of systemic 
risk. The CoVaR measure is defined as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the financial system 
conditional on an individual financial institution being under distress. The ΔCoVaR gauges the 
marginal contribution of individual financial institutions to systemic risk. Both measures have 
proven to be advantageous in the identification and construction of rankings of systemically 
relevant institutions. This is demonstrated by the frequent empirical application of both 
systemic risk measures across research and regulatory institutions3. Huang et al. (2009) uses 
the probability of default and asset return correlations of individual financial institutions as 
systemic risk indicators. 
Acharya et al. (2017) measures an individual financial entity’s contribution to systemic risk 
as the systemic expected shortfall (SES). The SES measures the expected losses of an 
individual financial institution given that the financial system in its entirety is undercapitalized. 
The SES is associated with an institution’s leverage and its marginal expected shortfall (MES) 
(i.e. its losses in the tail of the aggregate sector’s loss distribution). The intended use of the 
SES measure is to help financial institutions recognise and embody the externalities arising 
from their own risk and default. Brownlees and Engle (2017) dynamically model the capital 
shortfall of a financial entity as a dependent factor of the firms’ size, extent of leverage and its 
correlation as well as volatility through their systemic risk (SRISK) indices.  
The second strand of the literature is on modelling interconnectedness and co-movements 
among financial institutions. These are other studies that focus on modelling commonality and 
co-movement amongst financial institutions as a source of systemic risk. Billio, Getmansky, 
Lo, and Pelizzon (2012), for example, model the interconnectedness of the financial system 
based on two econometric techniques, the Granger causality test and the PCA. The analysis 
focuses on four types of financial institutions. These financial institutions are hedge funds, 
banks, broker/dealers and insurance companies. The results revealed that the four sectors have 
become highly interrelated and likely increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and 
insurance industries. Kritzman, Li, Page, and Rigbon (2011) developed the absorption ratio 
(AR), which captures the extent to which financial markets are interconnected. The idea behind 
the measure is that when markets are coupled, they become more susceptible to shocks. The 
AR proves to be coincided with many global financial crises and tracked other more complex 
measures of financial contagion. 
Moving to less complicated yet equally relevant measures of systemic risk, we consider 
interest rate spreads. The TED spread which is computed as the interest rate differential 
between the interbank market rate and the short-term Treasury bill rates, is used amongst 
practitioners as a broad measure of systemic risk (IMF, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; and 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013).  A widened TED spread signals liquidity pressures and 
                                                          
3Bernal et al., 2014; Castro and Ferrari, 2014; Drakos and Kouretas, 2015 and López-Espinoza et al., 2012. 
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uncertainty in the credit markets. According to Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), the spread 
is associated with systemic risk owing to its ability to indicate whether financial entities can 
perform their activities as suppliers of funds or are interrupted by shocks affecting liquidity, 
default or flight to quality. 
Several empirical studies evaluated the proposed measures of systemic risk. Several studies 
and regulators have questioned the effectiveness and validity of the above-mentioned proposed 
measures of systemic risk. One cluster applies a variety of approaches to evaluate the risk 
metrics. Benoît et al. (2013) propose a comparison of several systemic risk measures, namely 
the MES, SRISK, and ΔCoVaR. The empirical analysis investigates whether the different 
systemic risk measures can come to the same conclusion in identifying and ranking of 
significant financial entities. The results reveal an inconsistency amongst the rankings of SIFIs 
from the different systemic risk measures. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) compare and 
rank a variety of European and U.S. market-based systemic risk measures. The rankings are 
based on three criteria (Granger causality tests, Gonzalo and Granger metric, and correlation 
with an index of systemic events and policy actions). The results show that measures based on 
credit default swaps perform better than those based on interbank rates or stock market prices. 
In a later study, Kleinow et al. (2017) applies four commonly used systemic risk measures 
across three sectors in the financial industry, and thereafter compares the performance of each 
systemic risk metric. The results prove to be contradictory, with different measures indicating 
different levels of systemic risk across the different types of financial institutions. 
The third strand of the literature focuses on the interaction of systemic risk and the macro-
economy. Allen et al. (2012) thus devised a measure of aggregate financial systemic risk based 
on historical stock returns of U.S. financial institutions (CATFIN). The study then applied a 
multivariate predictive regression to assess the predictive ability of CATFIN on future 
macroeconomic activity. In similar research, Neumann (2014) constructs an aggregate 
financial sector tail risk measure derived from option prices of financial sector firms in the US. 
The study further employs a predictive regression to investigate the measure’s ability to predict 
future real economic activity. Both studies make use of a range of indicators that represent real 
economic activity in the US economy and evaluate the robustness of their models. Both studies 
find that their respective measures of systemic risk demonstrate the ability to significantly 
forecast economic activity for several periods in both an in- and out-sampling setting.  
Boucher and Maillet (2015), and Giglio et al. (2016) embark on similar research, with both 
studies applying and examining a large set of proposed measures of systemic risk on the ability 
to predict low quantiles of the distribution of macroeconomic indicators. Both studies employ 
the QR approach.  However, these two studies differ in terms of the focus of the downside risk 
of macroeconomic variables. Giglio et al. (2016) focus on the 20th percentile, whilst Boucher 
and Maillet (2015) considers the fifth percentile as representative of severe crises. Giglio et al. 
(2016) finds that only a few measures (mainly financial sector volatility measures) possess the 
ability to capture macroeconomic downside tail risk. Furthermore, the study shows that an 
appropriate aggregation of the systemic risk measures encompasses the ability to robustly and 
significantly predict macroeconomic risk. Whilst Boucher and Maillet (2015) finds that 
financial stress indicators, especially the default spread contain significant information on the 
downside of the distribution of real economic activity. 
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Regarding the South African literature, a limited number of studies has been published with 
regards to the phenomenon of systemic risk in the country’s financial system. Each of the 
existing studies focus on a particular facet of systemic risk in the South African banking 
industry. Esterhuysen et al. (2011) tailors a technique developed by Huang et al. (2009) to 
determine the impact of strained economic conditions on systemic risk in the South African 
banking sector. Their results show that the GFC increased systemic risk in South Africa, but to 
a lesser extent than other large international banks and economies. Manguzvane and Mwamba 
(2017; 2019) applies the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) 
to identify and rank systemically important banks in the South African banking industry. Over 
the sample period 2007 to 2016 they find that FirstRand Limited was the largest contributor to 
systemic risk followed by Standard Bank, ABSA, Nedbank, Capitec Bank and lastly African 
Bank. The results suggest that systemic risk is largely associated with the size of the financial 
institutions. Foggitt et al. (2017) applies the SRISK to quantify the capital shortfall of South 
African banking entities during extreme distress in the entire financial sector. Interestingly, the 
study identifies the smallest bank in the sample as the largest contributor to systemic risk during 
tranquility. However, during periods of financial turmoil, the contributions of other larger 
banks increased. 
A review of the above empirical studies in both developed and developing (in particular, 
South Africa) countries lead to a conclusion that systemic risk is a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon which cannot be captured or represented  by using  a single measure. Thus, this 
study models and evaluates a range of systemic risk measures to assist regulators in monitoring 
vulnerabilities in the financial system and deciphering whether the vulnerabilities arising from 
the financial sector poses significant risk to the macroeconomic activity. Such an approach will 
provide regulators with enough time to implement policy responses to neutralize the impact of 
vulnerabilities and address these vulnerabilities. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Quantile Regression 
 
This study employs the quantile regression (QR) approach developed by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978) to investigate how distress in the financial system may influence 
macroeconomic risk.  Macroeconomic risk can be measured by estimating the value-at-risk 
(VaR), which is the worst potential outcome at a given probability. The QR approach allows 
for directly modelling the quantile of interest for VaR estimation. Macroeconomic risk relates 
to the 𝜏𝑡ℎ quantile of the economic activity distribution (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic risk 
 
The QR can calculate macroeconomic risk through its ability to model the conditional quantile 
of South African economic activity distribution 𝐺𝑡 on available information  𝑍 (i.e. systemic 
risk measures). 
This linear conditional quantile function is 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡𝛽′ + 𝜀𝑡         (1) 
where 𝜀𝑡 are iid mean zero random variables with quantile function  𝑄𝜀(𝜏) and 𝑍𝑡 are k-by-1 
vector of regressors, including an intercept term and lagged residuals. Then, conditional on the 
regressor  𝑍𝑡, the 𝜏𝑡ℎ quantile of G is a linear function of 𝑍𝑡 𝑄𝐺𝑡(𝜏|𝑍𝑡) = 𝑍𝑡𝛽′ + 𝑄𝜀(𝜏) = 𝛽(𝜏)′𝑍𝑡      (2) 
where 𝛽(𝜏)′ = (𝛽1 + 𝑄𝜀(𝜏), 𝛽2, … 𝛽𝑘. The 𝜏𝑡ℎ conditional quantile of G can be estimated by ?̂?𝐺𝑡(𝜏|𝑍𝑡) = 𝑍𝑡′ ?̂?(𝜏)         (3) 
where ?̂?(𝜏) = arg min𝛽∈𝑅𝑘 [∑ 𝜏|𝑔𝑡𝑡∈{𝑡:𝐺𝑡≥𝑍𝑡𝛽} − 𝑧𝑡′ 𝛽| + ∑ (1 − 𝜏)|𝑔𝑡 −𝑡∈{𝑡:𝐺𝑡<𝑍𝑡𝛽} 𝑧𝑡′ 𝛽|     (4)  
is called the regression quantiles. Let  𝜌𝜏(𝜀) = 𝜀(𝜏 − 𝐼(𝜀 < 0)), then ?̂?(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min𝛽∈𝑅𝑘 ∑ 𝜌𝜏(𝑔𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡′ 𝛽)𝑛𝑖=1           (5) 
The QR function is used to measure the effect of individual systemic risk measures on South 
African economic activity, both in the lower tails and median of outcome distribution. In order 
to serve the purpose of this paper, we will typically be focused on the extreme lower quantiles 
of the QR function 𝜏 = 0.05. 
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3.2. Pseudo R (Goodness of Fit) 
 
According to Koenker and Machado (1999), 𝑅1 is used as a measure of goodness of fit at the 
particular (𝜏) quantile. Let 𝑉(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min𝛽∈𝑅𝑃 ∑ 𝜌𝜏(𝑔𝑖 − 𝑧𝑡′ 𝛽𝜏)𝑛𝑖=1        (6) 
where 𝐺𝑡 is the monthly time series of economic activity and  𝑧𝑡′ is a vector of systemic risk 
proxies. Let ?̂?(𝜏) and 𝛽(𝜏) be the coefficient estimates for the unrestricted and restricted 
model respectively and let ?̂? and ?̃? be the corresponding 𝑉 terms. 
They define the goodness of fit criterion 𝑅1(𝜏) = 1 − 𝑉?̃?  . 
 
3.3 Institutional-specific Risk:  Conditional Value-at-Risk, 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 and Delta CoVaR, 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 
 
Well-recognized measure of systemic risk proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) the 
CoVaR. The value-at-risk of the financial system as a whole given that an individual financial 
institution is under distress. The value-at-risk of an individual financial institution captures the 
distressed state of a particular institution: 𝑃𝑟(𝑋 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞𝑖) = 𝑞              (7) 
The CoVaR of the financial system given that a particular financial institution (𝑖) is at its VaR 
is defined as: 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑠𝑦𝑠 < 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞 𝑠𝑦𝑠|𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖𝑞) = 𝑞         (8) 
The above equation is estimated with a conditional quantile regression whereby 𝑞 = 0.05. 
ΔCoVaR measures the contribution to systemic risk given that an institution moves from a 
“normal” state to “stressed” state. ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠|𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅0.05𝑠𝑦𝑠|𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅0.5𝑠𝑦𝑠|𝑖      (9) 
3.4 Co-Movement and Interconnectedness:  Principal Component Analysis of bank returns, 
eigenvalue returns 
 
Recent studies on systemic risk have made use of the principal component analysis to measure 
the co-movement, cross-correlation and contagion amongst securities or financial sectors 
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(Zheng et al, 2012; Kritzman et al, 2011; Billio et al, 2012). The following measure is used to 
measure the interrelation and concentration of the South African financial system.  
In measuring the commonality in the South African banking sector as an indication of systemic 
risk, this study uses a principal component analysis (PCA) to decompose the covariance matrix 
of the six banks as in Billio et al (2012). The covariance matrix of the returns of the six banks 
is estimated as: Σ̂ ≡  1𝑇−6 ∑ (𝑅𝑡 − ?̅?)(𝑅𝑡 − ?̅?)′𝑇𝑡=1        (10) 
Where 𝑇 represents the number of observations in the sample period and ?̅? represents the vector 
of average returns. Through the covariance matrix, six eigenvalues and six eigenvectors 
estimated. In this analysis, we apply a 24-month rolling window principal component analysis 
to track the time variation in the magnitude of the eigenvalue of the returns. This allows us to 
detect increasing correlation, connections and integration amongst the banks, which can 
contribute to systemic risk. Billio et al (2012) states that the reasoning behind the use of the 
PCA is that systemic risk is more apparent when the largest eigenvalue explains most of the 
variation of the data. Thus, a sharp rise in PCA may serve as an indication of systemic risk 
Zheng et al (2012).   
According to Billio et al (2012), the “commonality” between the six institutions is expressed 
by the loadings of each respective bank corresponding to the largest eigenvalues. More 
specifically, if the institutions eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue has similar 
entries, then all six institutions have similar exposure to this principal component. This is an 
indication of systemic risk through contagion. 
3.5 Volatility  
 
High levels of volatility in the financial market has been associated with financial crises. High 
levels volatility is largely seen as an indication of uncertainty and undermining the stability of 
the financial system. Moreover, according to Danielsson et al (2016) “forward-looking 
economic agents” can see high volatility as a signal of the increased risk of adverse future 
outcomes and a pending crisis. We consider two measures of volatility as an indication of 
systemic risk. These are average conditional volatility and exchange rate volatility. 
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Average Conditional Volatility 
We model the average conditional volatility of the six South African banks using GARCH 
models, as a measure of systemic risk in the South African banking industry as suggested by 
Sankaran (2011). Due to the inherent leverage effects and fat tail distributions4 in equity prices 
we employ one of the asymmetric GARCH models and assume the errors follow a Student’s t-
distribution. The mean equation is specified as follows: 𝛥 ln(𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛥 ln(𝑟𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝑡       (11) 
The variance equation is specified by EGARCH (1, 1) model: log(𝜎𝑡2) = 𝜔 + 𝛼 |𝜖𝑡−1𝜎𝑡−1| + 𝛾 𝜖𝑡−1𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜎𝑡−12 )     (12) 
We use weekly data to calculate the conditional volatility of an individual bank and thereafter 
aggregate the series of volatility by averaging the conditional volatility amongst the six banks. 
Exchange rate Volatility 
With the South African economy extensively involved in world trade, the exchange rate and 
the volatility thereof are a pivotal component that influences economic activity in South Africa. 
To model the uncertainty of the Rand relative to the US Dollar, this paper applies one of the 
variations of the volatility model introduced by Engle (1982) the Generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity GARCH (1, 1) with a skewed student t-distribution.  
The general framework of the GARCH (p, q) is expressed as follows: 𝜎𝑡2 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑢𝑡−𝑖2𝑞𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝜎𝑡−𝑗2𝑝𝑗=1       (13) 
Derived from the above equation the GARCH (1, 1) is expressed by: 𝜎𝑡2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑢0 + 𝛽𝑗𝜎𝑡−12         (14) 
The study used daily exchange rate data to construct the exchange rate volatility and thereafter 
averaged it over monthly intervals. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Explain leverage effects and fat tail distribution of equity prices 
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3.6  Interest rate spreads 
 
This study estimate or consider two measures of interest rate spreads. These are long term 
spreads (LTSt) and short term spread (TEDt). The long term spread (LTSt) is the difference in 
the yields of a ten-year government bond and the three-month Treasury bill.  𝐿𝑇𝑆𝑛 = 𝑖10𝑦𝑟 − 𝑖3𝑀 𝑇𝐵        (15) 
The short term spread (𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡) is constructed by subtracting the South African three-month T-
bill rate from the 3-month Johannesburg Interbank Average Rate (JIBAR). 
  𝑇𝐸𝐷 = 𝑖𝐽𝐼𝐵𝐴𝑅 − 𝑖3𝑀 𝑇𝐵        (16) 
3.6. Construction and evaluation of the Systemic Risk Index 
 
Systemic risk is complex in nature needing different measures to capture the different aspects 
of systemic risk. Following the intuition of Gigilo et al. (2016), supposing that all systemic risk 
measures are imperfectly measured versions of an unobservable systemic risk factor this essay 
intends to capture the different aspect of systemic risk by aggregating the different measures 
into a single measure of systemic risk called the “Systemic Stress Index of South Africa”. 
Therefore, we use data reduction techniques in modelling covariability of the data in terms of 
a few number of unobserved latent factors on the conditional quantile of GDP growth. Once 
more, we follow the intuition of Giglio et al (2016) by conducting a two-stage procedure known 
as the principal component quantile regression (PCQR). Firstly, a principal component analysis 
is conducted to aggregate the large set of predictors into a small number of predictors. 
Secondly, the output of the PCA is used as regressors in the estimation of extremal downside 
quantile of GDP growth i.e. macroeconomic risk.  
In doing so, we put forth the assumption that the 𝜏𝑡ℎ quantile of 𝐺𝑡, conditional on available 
information ℱ𝑡−1 is a function of unobservable latent factors: 𝑄𝜏(𝐺𝑡|ℱ𝑡−1) = 𝛿𝑓𝑡         (17) 
The large set of predictors are defined as vector 𝑧𝑡 where: 𝑧𝑡 = Λ𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (18) 
Where 𝜀𝑡 is a vector of idiosyncratic disturbances. 
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𝐺𝜏|𝑡 = 𝛽𝐹′ 𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡         (19) 
Estimate ?̂?𝑡 by (Λ′Λ)−1Λ′𝑥𝑡 for Λ the K eigenvectors associated with the K largest eigenvalues 
of ∑ 𝑥𝑡𝑥𝑡′𝑇𝑡=1 . ?̂?𝑡 ≡ ( ?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑇) is a matrix of K eigenvectors associated with the K largest 
eigenvalues. 
Time series quantile regression  𝑄𝜏(𝐺𝑡|ℱ𝑡−1) = 𝛿′𝐹𝑡 = 𝛿𝑓𝑡        (20) (𝛿0̂𝛿) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛿0,𝛿 1𝑇 ∑ 𝜌𝜏(𝑔𝑡 − 𝛿′𝐹𝑡)𝑛𝑖=1       (21) 
Where 𝛿 is the quantile regression coefficient on the components. 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Following an extensive review of the empirical literature on modelling systemic risk, this 
study uses weekly equity prices of the six largest banks in South Africa (ABSA, “bga”; Capitec 
Bank, “cpi”; FirstRand Limited, “fsr”; Nedbank, “ned”; Standard Bank, “sbk” and Investec, 
“inl”). According to Jackson and Perraudin (2002), the banking sector is generally perceived 
to pose threats to the financial system, given its important functions therein. Moreover, 
Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) consider banks’ relative size as a driver of systemic 
importance. Furthermore, we use the USD/ZAR exchange rate and a combination of long- and 
short-term interest rates namely the 3-month Treasury bill (3M T-bill), Johannesburg interbank 
average rate (JIBAR) and the 10 year bond rates. These data is easily accessible on I-net BFA 
5and DataStream6.  
The composite leading indicator (CLI) for South Africa, as sourced from the South African 
Reserve Bank is used in this analysis to represent real economic activity. The South African 
CLI is calculated using SA GDP growth rates as the reference series. It is intended to provide 
early signals of turning points in business cycles. This view is supported by the South African 
Reserve Bank. The data is available on the South African Reserve Bank database. This study 
uses a sample period of nine years spanning from 31/03/2007 – 31/03/2016. That means the 
study conducting an analysis using 109 monthly observations. However, the sample period 
used includes significant downturns such as the one that occurred in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 I-Net BFA are providers of economic and financial market data. 
6
 Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of weekly log returns of the six banks (31/03/2007 - 
31/03/2016) 
 
ABSA Standard 
Bank 
Nedbank FirstRand 
Limited  
Capitec 
Bank 
Investec 
 Mean 0.0078 0.0412 0.0568 0.1383 0.5891 0.0339 
 Std. Dev. 3.7105 3.7541 3.6621 4.1541 4.1002 4.4505 
 Maximum 16.0773 21.9157 14.1618 18.5964 13.8500 19.0320 
 Minimum -16.3847 -17.2675 -15.8317 -24.1804 -16.6751 -18.6650 
 Skewness -0.1668 0.2424 -0.2288 -0.4449 -0.2850 -0.3253 
 Kurtosis 5.6215 7.5354 4.9694 7.9396 4.3087 5.7796 
Jarque-
Bera 
138.2211 411.7658 80.91502 498.6014 40.33057 161.305 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the weekly equity return series of all banks 
included in the study. Table 1 shows that the average weekly equity returns series of all the 
banks are positive, with Capitec Bank and ABSA recording the highest and lowest average 
weekly returns respectively. The return series of all the banks is extremely volatile as shown 
by the standard deviation. Standard Bank profited the most during the upswing. It recorded the 
largest maximum value. Whilst First Rand recorded the largest loss during the downswing with 
the largest minimum value. The return series of all the banks are characterized by extreme 
negative values as exhibited by the negative skewness, with the exception of Standard Bank. 
Furthermore, all the returns series exhibit excess kurtosis suggesting that the returns are not 
normally distributed. This is further confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test which reject the 
normality of the distributions for all the returns.   
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Results for CoVaR and ΔCoVaR  
 
The results of the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR are presented in Figure 2. Figure 2 depicts the time 
series of the 5% VaR of the South African banking sector when each of the six banks are in 
distress (i.e. returns are at the 5% VaR level). 
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Notes: bga_covar, CoVaR granted Barclays Africa at VaR; sbk_covar, CoVaR granted Standard Bank at VaR; ned_covar, 
CoVaR granted Nedbank at VaR; fsr_covar, CoVaR granted FirstRand at VaR; capi_covar, CoVaR granted Capitec Bank at 
VaR; inl_covar, CoVaR granted Investec Ltd at VaR. 
Figure 2: Weekly 5% CoVaR by each bank (31/03/2007 - 31/03/2016) 
 
Essentially, Figure 2 shows the spill-over effects of systemic risk when each of the banks are 
deemed to be in distress over the sample period. Across the timeline, the entire time series 
move in tandem, indicating that the spill-over effect of each of the South African banks to the 
system is on average evenly balanced. More importantly, the results prove to be consistent even 
during periods of crises, with no bank possessing excessive spill-overs to the entire system. 
Such results may also be an indication of high interconnectedness in the South African banking 
system. These results compares favourably with previous studies on South Africa, such as 
Manguzvane and Mwamba (2017). This is despite the fact that Manguzvane and Mwamba 
(2017) identified FirstRand Limited as the leading contributor to systemic risk. This is 
compared to this current study that identified ABSA as the largest contributor to systemic risk 
as presented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 3: Weekly ΔCoVaR by each bank (31/03/2007 - 31/03/2016) 
 
Figure 3 depicts the time series of the marginal systemic risk contribution of each bank 
measured by taking the difference between the distress-state (5%) CoVaR of an institution and 
the benchmark-state (50%) CoVaR of that institution. This gives a clear understanding of the 
dynamics of the banks’ contributions to systemic risk over time. Two distinct patterns amongst 
the sample of banks across the timeline can be seen. Capitec Bank and Investec had the smallest 
effect on the system over the entire sample period. These two banks were the smallest 
contributors to systemic risk as they are consistently above those of the other banks. Figure 3 
reveals that the other four banks (ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedbank and FirstRand Limited), are 
always moving together and seem to follow a common trend. Figure 3 also shows that during 
the 2008 global financial crisis, the ΔCoVaRs of these banks increased dramatically. This 
implies that during the crisis, the banks’ contribution to systemic risk increased. These results 
are contrary to previous studies conducted in South Africa (such as Foggit et al, 2017). Foggit 
et al (2017) concluded that the smallest banks (Capitec Bank and Investec) were the largest 
contributor to systemic risk.  
 
Table 2: Average weekly ΔCoVaR by bank (31/03/2007 – 31/03/2016) 
ABSA Standard Bank Nedbank FirstRand Limited Capitec Bank Investec 
-3.37727 -3.1945 -3.03915 -3.36813 -1.32179 -1.35438 
 
Table 2 presents the cross-section average marginal contribution of systemic risk by 
each bank. Table 2 indicates that on average ABSA adds 3.377 percentage points to the VaR 
of the banking system when it moves from operating normally to a state of distress. The number 
is also the largest of the average ΔCoVaRs. This means that over the sample period, ABSA 
was the largest contributor to systemic risk in the South African banking system. FirstRand 
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Limited (which contributed 3.368 percent) and Standard Bank (which contributed 3.19 percent) 
were on average the second and third largest contributors respectively. Nedbank contributed 
3.039 percent to the systemic risk in the banking sector. The two smallest banks, Capitec Bank 
and Investec were the smallest contributors to systemic risk. In line with the too big to fail 
theory, we can thus classify the “Big Four” banks (ABSA, Standard Bank, FirstRand Limited 
and Nedbank) as the SIFIs in the South African banking sector.  These results are not consistent 
with those of Foggit et al (2017). 
 
 
4.2.2 Results of Rolling PCA 
Figure 4 displays the dynamics of the six principal components (PCs) of the monthly return 
series of South African banks during the period 2006 to 2016 over a 12-month rolling window. 
This approach allows us to detect the degree of commonality and concentration amongst the 
banks, which can contribute to systemic risk. 
 
 
Figure 4: Dynamic Principal component analysis of monthly return of six banks 
 
The results show that first principal component (PC1) has the highest eigenvalue, capturing 
most of the return variation (64%) over the sample period. The first eigenvalue of returns 
approximately captures the variation ranging from approximately 43% to 81%. We observe 
that the proportion of the variance explained by PC1 increases from June 2007 and reaches its 
peak in July 2008, indicating a highly interrelated financial system during times of crisis. This 
is indicative of herding behaviour, which amplifies the effects of an initial shock to the system 
and increases systemic risk within the entire system. Upon further investigation of the results, 
we identify the “Big Four” banks (ABSA, Standard Bank, FirstRand Limited and Nedbank) as 
having larger loadings on PC1 than Capitec Bank and Investec. This further suggests that the 
“Big Four” banks form part of what is known as the too interconnected to fail (TICTF) 
institutions. This concentration of the banking sector may present an upside. However, it too 
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poses a grave downside should a negative event take place, leaving South Africa more 
susceptible to systemic risk.  
. 
4.2.3 Results of volatility measures 
 Figure 5 plots the (weekly) average conditional volatility of six banks using the 
EGARCH (1, 1) volatility model from 2007 to 2016. The South African banking industry is 
characterised by two periods of volatility clustering, which represent an increase in systemic 
risk. 
 
 
Figure 5: Average weekly conditional volatility of the six banks (31/03/2007 - 31/03/2016) 
 
The indicator demonstrates the ability to detect the 2008 global financial crisis and, in 
addition, it is useful as it identifies the development of vulnerabilities in the banking industry. 
This can be seen in the average volatility and volatility clustering of 2007 which led to a 
significant rise and peak in late 2008. In late 2015, the indicator rapidly shoots up, indicating 
a significant increase in systemic risk in the South African banking industry which was partly 
attributed to political uncertainty during that period. This was met with a negative reaction 
from the financial sector (thus owing to domestic factors). The second incident may possibly 
be attribute to the fact that the Chinese stock market was in turbulence (thus owing to 
international factors).  
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4.2.4 Results of interest rate spread  
 Figure 6 depicts the progression of both the LTS and TED spreads over the sample 
period. According to theory, a positive TED spread and negative LTS spread (i.e. inverted bond 
yield curve) signal financial and economic turmoil.  
 
 
Figure 6: Term and Ted spread (31/03/2007 - 31/03/2016)  
 
Figure 6 shows that during the pre-crisis period, both positive TED and negative TERM 
spread are visible, signalling the commencement of the subprime crisis. Furthermore, in the 
last quarter of 2008, a further widening of the interest rate differentials can be observed 
respectively. This provided signals for the extreme financial and economic stress. In the 
subsequent period, the TED spread contracts and the LTS spread reverts to positive values. 
This is an indication of the end to uncertainty and turmoil. The results are consistent with those 
of the empirical literature conducted in other emerging economies. 
 
4.2.5 Evaluation of systemic risk measures 
This sub-section presents the results of the QR approach for evaluating systemic risk 
measures based on its ability to forecast macroeconomic risk. In doing so, we conduct a series 
of univariate quantile estimation of each lagged systemic risk measure on the downside 
extremal quantiles (5%) of CLI growth.7 The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 We also estimate the median regression (50%) of CLI growth 
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Table 3: Predictive quantile regression (macro. risk) 
Covariates τ (0.05) Pseudo R (%) 𝐂𝐨𝐕𝐚𝐑𝐭−𝟏 0.7323*** 
(3.6798) 
44.2292 
𝐃𝐂𝐨𝐕𝐚𝐑𝐭−𝟏 2.0866*** 
(5.8806) 
48.4327 
𝐏𝐂𝟏𝐭−𝟏 -15.4947*** 
(-11.4721) 
37.6218 
𝐀𝐯𝐞_𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐝_𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭−𝟏 -0.18298*** 
(-4.8648) 
51.7607 
𝐓𝐞𝐝 𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝 𝐭−𝟏 -4.1391*** 
(-6.6781) 
42.9112 
𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦 𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐭−𝟏 0.9833*** 
(11.4367) 
57.0804 
Observations 109  
Notes: Table reports univariate quantile regression at τ (5%). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. Only the coefficient, t-stat () and Pseudo R-squared of the systemic 
risk measure are reported. Boot strapped standard errors with 1000 replications. Sample is 2007M03 – 2016M03.  
 
Table 3 presents a series of univariate QR estimation of each lagged systemic risk 
measure on the fifth percentile of SA CLI growth from 03/2007 (heron referred to as 2007M3) 
to 03/2016 (2016M3). The table presents the estimated coefficients along with the significance 
and goodness of fit statistics computed using bootstrapped standard errors. We find that each 
and every single systemic risk measure exhibit significant predictive and explanatory power on 
the downside tail of macroeconomic risk. According to the results, high levels of commonality 
within the banking industry demonstrates the largest impact on the lower quantile of real 
activity. This is followed by the widening in the TED spread, which falls in line with economic 
theory. Regarding explanatory power, interest spreads contain the most information on 
downside macroeconomic risk followed by the volatility, institutional-specific risk and 
commonality metrics.  
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Table 4: Predictive quantile regression (median) 
Covariates τ (0.50) Pseudo R (%) 𝐂𝐨𝐕𝐚𝐑𝐭−𝟏 0.5225*** 
(4.5428) 
18.7781 
𝐃𝐂𝐨𝐕𝐚𝐑𝐭−𝟏 1.4046*** 
(5.8848) 
19.6309 
𝐏𝐂𝟏𝐭−𝟏 -4.4477*** 
(-2.9979) 
7.6186 
𝐚𝐯𝐞_𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐝_𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭−𝟏 -0.1490*** 
(-8.0857) 
26.8983 
𝐓𝐞𝐝 𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝 𝐭−𝟏 -2.6794*** 
(-5.7637) 
17.8561 
𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦 𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐭−𝟏 0.6019*** 
(2.9885) 
15.8704 
Observations 109  
Notes: Table reports univariate quantile regression at τ (5%). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. Only the coefficient, t-stat () and Pseudo R-squared of the systemic 
risk measure are reported. Boot strapped standard errors with 1000 replications. Sample is 2007M03 – 2016M03.  
 
 
In comparison to the central tendency, Table 4 presents the results of the predictive QR 
on the median of South African CLI growth. Regarding the significance of the systemic risk 
measures, the results prove to be consistent with that of the lower quantiles. Furthermore, the 
measures of systemic risk exhibit weaker predictive and explanatory power in the median 
quantile than those of the lower quantiles. The results provide evidence that the constructed 
systemic risk measures are indeed not only associated with real economic activity, but are 
significant predictors of downside macroeconomic risk. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study conducted an empirical analysis on systemic and macroeconomic risk in the 
South African economy. We modelled the different aspects of systemic risk by constructing 
several measures of systemic risk. These are CoVaR, ΔCoVaR, principal component analysis 
(PCA), average conditional volatility and interest rate spreads to monitor the systemic stress in 
the South African financial system. Thereafter, we evaluated the importance of each candidate 
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measure by testing its ability to predict lower quantiles of economic activity (macroeconomic 
risk). 
The results revealed that individually, the constructed measures demonstrate the ability to 
capture periods of extreme financial disturbance in the South African financial sector. In the 
process, we could identify the largest banks in South Africa and call them “Big Four” as the 
SIFIs and forming part of the TICTF institutions in the banking sector. If these are not properly 
regulated (or weak regulation) may pose grave systemic risk. Furthermore, we provided 
evidence that the constructed systemic risk measures are significantly informative about future 
economic downswings in the South African economy as opposed to the median distribution of 
real economic activity. 
 
This study goes beyond other empirical studies in both developed and developing countries 
and specifically South Africa. The results of this study reveals that systemic risk is a complex 
and multifaceted phenomenon. Systemic risk cannot be represented by means of using a single 
measure. This study was therefore able to model and evaluates a range of systemic risk 
measures to assist regulators in monitoring vulnerabilities in the financial system and 
untangling whether the vulnerabilities arising from the financial sector poses significant risk to 
the macroeconomic activity. The results of this study are expected to provide regulators with 
enough time to implement policy responses that can neutralize and lessen the impact of 
systemic risk on South Africa’s macroeconomic activities. Although the results compares 
favourably with previous studies in South Africa, it is in some cases contrary to one previous 
study conducted (in South Africa). This is not unexpected because the current study used 
different methodologies compared to previous research. 
 
The main implication of this study lies in its provision of tools to assist South African 
regulators with the surveillance of the South African financial system by identifying build-ups 
of systemic vulnerabilities, SIFIs and TICTF institutions. Moreover, the tools provided by this 
study are useful in the early warning analysis of financial systemic risk and the consequences 
of systemic risk on macroeconomic outcomes. Such an approach will provide regulators with 
enough time to implement policy responses to neutralize the impact of vulnerabilities and 
address these vulnerabilities.  
Suggestions for future research would be to include other financial institutions in the dataset 
such as insurance and investment companies to have a broader understanding of systemic stress 
in the South African financial system. Moreover, we suggest an application of the regime-
switching model to better understand the complex dynamics between systemic risk and 
macroeconomic outcomes. Lastly, we recommend the application of alternative significance 
criterion such as out-sample forecasting or back testing to evaluate effectiveness of the tools as 
indicators of systemic risk and assist in the identification of appropriate measures of systemic 
risk suitable for South African regulators. 
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